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 This paper analyses changes in television broadcasting in Eastern Europe 
after the break-up of communism. They are considered in the light of the 
socio-political changes that parallel them. It is argued that the changes were 
modest rather than radical. Two explanations we proposed to support the 
main argument. Firstly, changes in television broadcasting after 1989 did not 
mean a radical break with the communist model, because that model itself had 
partly changed before 1989, especially in the 1980s. Secondly, they were not 
complete because of the different legacies from the past that acted as serious 
obstacles blocking more systematic changes. 
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Introduction 
 The role of the media in the break-up of communism and transforming of 
Eastern European societies is considered very important by many scholars1. 
Sill, it stays out of their main research interests. Even media specialists, con-
centrated mainly on Western media, do not have much to say about trans-
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forming media in transforming societies. Although political and social changes 
in post-communist countries cannot be fully explained without taking into ac-
count the role of the media, and the media in Eastern Europe cannot be under-
stood without putting them into the political context, broader theories, which 
would attempt to relate those two aspects of transformation and explain rela-
tionships between them, are almost non-existent. However, some scholars, 
Splichal (1994, 1995), Downing (1996), O’Neil (1997) and Sparks and Read-
ing (1994, 1998) for instance, have realized necessity to bridge the gap be-
tween media theories and political science approach in studies of transforma-
tion of Eastern Europe.  
 The starting point of this essay is the same – the understanding of media 
changes in Eastern Europe requires placing them into a broader political con-
text. Thus, the aim of the article is twofold. First, it is to answer the question – 
how much has television broadcasting in Eastern Europe changed after the 
1989 revolutions. And second, to explain the socio-political context when nec-
essary to understand the changes (or lack of the changes). I will argue that, al-
though there were some significant shifts in television broadcasting practice 
after the break-up of communism, this did not mean a radical break with the 
past. Two main reasons will be presented. First, some changes have already 
started before 1989. Second, and more important, some mechanisms inherited 
from the past have continued to operate and impeded radical changes. The 
changes will, for that purpose, be defined as departure from communist televi-
sion broadcasting model towards public television broadcasting model. The 
analyses will be focused on television, due to its special importance among the 
media. The examples and conclusions will mainly refer to Visegrad countries 
– Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary, because of their rela-
tively similar historical and current economic and political conditions. Bearing 
in mind significant differences amongst them too, the stress will be, however, 
on the more general conditions and processes, which they have had in com-
mon. 
 
The communist model of television broadcasting: how much has 
changed before 1989? 
 The interpretation of changes in television broadcasting in Eastern Europe 
depends on their positioning in a broader theoretical framework of socio-po-
litical transformations. Sparks with Reading (1998) identifies four broader ap-
proaches to 1989 changes in Eastern European societies. They differ on two 
dimensions. The first one is similarity/differences of capitalist and communist 
societies; the second one is the type and pervasiveness of changes after the 
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revolutions. The dominant view in the West, according to Sparks and Reading, 
is the ‘total transformation’ thesis, which is most famously articulated by Fu-
kuyama (Fukuyama, 1992). It claims both radical differences between the two 
social systems before 1989, as well as radical social and political changes in 
post-communist societies after the revolutions – the old totalitarian order was 
completely replaced by liberal, democratic capitalist one.  
 Of course, before any discussion about the changes after 1989, it is neces-
sary to start with positioning towards the state of affaires before those changes 
took place, for conclusions always depend on a starting point for evaluation. 
So, I am first going to argue that changes in television broadcasting in Eastern 
Europe in many aspects did not mean a radical break with the past, because the 
role of the television broadcasting went through some significant changes be-
fore 1989. This contradicts the ‘total transformation’ thesis, which sees East-
ern European societies before 1989 as totalitarian2. Although it is true that dif-
ferences between capitalist West and communist East before 1989 were sig-
nificant, they were not same in the 1980’s as they were in the 1950’s. The tight 
control of the central, one party apparatus over the rest of society in the East 
has weakened over time, especially during the last decade of communism. 
Thus, it is maybe more appropriate to call communist societies in their last pe-
riod post-totalitarian. There is a wide range discussion on the extent of social 
dynamism in communist era. I will focus on changes in media and, especially, 
television broadcasting. 
 Unlike in the West, where the independent media are seen as a necessary 
prerequisite for the limitation of the state potentially unlimited power, the 
main role of the communist media were to spread out ideas of the new com-
munist order, and the role of the party leadership in achieving the revolution-
ary goals – ‘[t]he Leninist model sees the media […] as really an arm of the 
state; it is the sector of the state that aims to secure legitimacy by enlightening 
the people as to what their needs really are’ (Downey, 1998, p. 53). Besides 
the tough central control of the way the reality was presented, there was an 
important complementary condition to secure the task of legitimating the 
communist system – the availability of alternative sources of information had 
to be minimized. Communist authorities controlled a free circulation of infor-
mation by different means – from restrictions to travel outside the boundaries 
of communist countries, to limitations of possessing telephones, fax machines 
or videos only to party apparatchiks. Needless to say, besides official, no other 
media were allowed. 
 But, it proved to be impossible to control the media completely. The late 
1950s witnessed emerging of samizdat, the illegal independent printing. The 
new media were even more difficult to control. While restrictions of spreading 
Medij. istraž. (god. 10, br. 1) 2004. (23-35) 
 
26 
alternative information sources were, intentionally or due to economic back-
wardness, facilitated by the slow introduction of new technology in communist 
countries, the opposite trend, an expansion of the new media, contributed sig-
nificantly to opening of the communication space. In the early 1950s, the 
United States set up two radio stations that could be listened in Eastern Euro-
pean countries: Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe (Holt3 in Goban-Klas 
and Sasinska-Klas, 1992, p. 80). ‘Since that time, foreign transmissions, not 
exclusively from Radio Liberty or Radio Free Europe but also the BBC World 
Service, Deutche Welle, Radio France Internationale, broadcasting in ver-
nacular languages, were continually present in Eastern Europe, affecting the 
knowledge and attitudes of its inhabitants’ (Goban-Klas and Sasinska-Klas, 
1992, p. 80). Jamming the signals by communist authorities proved to be in-
sufficient in preventing the spread of alternative information. Another chal-
lenge to official information came from illegally produced and distributed au-
dio and video tapes (ibid., pp. 80-84). Also, in some countries television pro-
grammes from neighbouring states could be seen without obstructions. ‘Unlike 
radio transmissions, there was never any attempt to jam or obstruct television 
signals even where they were quite widely available. Terrestrial signals from 
Austria and Yugoslavia could be received by around 30 percent of the Hun-
garian population’ (Sparks and Reading, 1994, p. 251), and roughly 90 percent 
of East Germans watched West German TV (Downey, 1998, p. 53). Since the 
mid-1980s, bureaucratic and legal obstacles for import of video equipment, 
personal computers and printers, as well as for introduction of cable television 
have been removed (ibid. p. 251; Goban Klas and Sasinska-Klas, 1992).  
 However, although its importance is certain, one cannot say that the expan-
sion of new technology caused the opening of the communication system in 
communism. There were other major changes in Eastern European societies 
that contributed to weakening of the central party control over communica-
tions. There were growing economic problems and dissatisfaction with the 
system among the citizens.  
 Jakubowicz stresses the inability of the communist system to maintain in-
ner cohesion and logic. That produced continuous power struggle, which then 
also influenced the media. ‘The twists and turns of political events always had 
an immediate effect on the media, in that concepts, ideas and elements of ide-
ology were introduced or withdrawn, defined and redefined in a totally arbi-
trary manner. Periods of relaxation automatically meant greater freedom of 
speech; the screws could be turned on again, but the propaganda that followed 
had much less credibility and was much less effective’ (Jakubowicz, 1994, p. 
273-274). The result was growing distrust and hostility to the system, which, 
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from the authority side, led to sacrificing ideological goals in favour of tactical 
political gains (ibid. p. 274).  
 One such tactic was introducing of foreign commercial, entertainment pro-
grammes. Despite the preference for domestic production and import from 
other socialist countries and quotas on import from the West, by the 1980s the 
nature of the broadcasted programmes departed substantially from the classic 
propaganda model. Even in a closed system like Czechoslovakia, 12 percent of 
total programming was imported from non-Eastern European countries. In 
more open Hungary, almost 70 percent of the programmes were from Western 
sources (Sparks and Reading, 1992, p. 250). Besides openness to foreign sig-
nals and nature of the broadcasted programmes, Sparks and Reading mention 
the third area of departure from the alleged norm of the communist television 
broadcasting model – readiness to carry advertising. That move towards the 
market model was introduced under growing economic pressures. Although 
the amounts carried were almost inconsiderable, the very presence of adver-
tisements ‘[…]signified a very small but real adjustment of broadcasting away 
from political and cultural ends towards those dictated by its economic posi-
tion’ (Sparks and Reading, 1992, p. 51).  
 The presented arguments about changes of television broadcasting before 
1989, however, are not to suggest that those changes meant a radical transfor-
mation of the communist model. As Sparks and Reading point out, communist 
broadcasters ‘accommodated to political changes, to popular discontent, to of-
ficial cynicism, and to plain old penury, with a considerable degree of adapta-
bility. What, however, remained completely out of agenda, and for which there 
is no evidence whatsoever that it even began to take place, was any change of 
the system’ ( Sparks with Reading, 1998, p. 70).  
 
Television broadcasting after 1989 – the public television model? 
 One of the main goals of the democratic opposition in Eastern Europe in 
the late 1980s was freeing the media from the state control. Television is usu-
ally considered the most powerful amongst all the media. In communism that 
was especially true. While decentralization and limited pluralism were allowed 
for the print media (Jakubowicz, 1994, p. 275) in the late 1980s, television 
stayed tightly controlled by the state. That only added to the importance of re-
structuring of television broadcasting after the break-up of communism. After 
the revolutions, there was consensus amongst new political elites that televi-
sion should be freed from the state influence, but, at the same time, that it 
should not become dependent on the extensive market logic. In other words, 
the public service model was advocated.  
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 According to Sparks and Reading, the usual meaning of public service 
broadcasting consists of two aspects. The first one is broadcasting independent 
from the government influence, especially with regard to the news and current 
affaires. The second one is a pursuit of inclusive and diverse programme 
driven strategies, which then should be more or less independent from market 
pressures (Sparks with Reading, 1998, p. 155). As I will argue below, televi-
sion broadcasting in Eastern Europe has not avoided the trap of neither politi-
cal nor economic dependence. Ideals about building public television model 
backed away under political and economic pressures.  
 This is maybe not surprising, because those ideals are born in the context 
that made political and economic processes out of the state control framework 
difficult to understand. What is surprising is the fact that a ‘third way’ option 
was not even taken into account seriously (Jakubowicz, 1994, p. 271). The 
case of Eastern Germany is an exception. But with the reunification these ef-
forts were superseded and Western capitalist model win domination over the 
Eastern Germany’s media (Downey, 1998, pp. 58-59). In other countries in 
Eastern Europe, the opportunity for introduction of democratic public televi-
sion was missed for ‘internal’ reasons. But, before turning to an explanation of 
that reasons, I will briefly state what has, and what has not, or not completely, 
changed in television broadcasting after 1989. 
 Significant departure is made from strict one-party control over broadcast-
ing. The party lost the monopoly of presenting ‘the only truth’ and pluralism 
of opinion is introduced. The censorship was abolished. And last, but not least, 
there were substantial decline from communist economic model in which tele-
vision broadcasting was state owned and funded from the budget. Private 
channels and advertisements were introduced as an important source of fi-
nancing.  
 But, if one aims to look into the changes in terms of moving towards inde-
pendent public television broadcasting, it could be said that the break with the 
past was indeed quite limited. Political interference has continued; the differ-
ence is that instead of the one party, different political actors’ interests can be 
pursued. Broadcasting councils’ members and chief officials have been ap-
pointed by parliaments or governments, and their appointment and dismissal 
has caused bitter political struggles, and even exceeding of legal authorization. 
Examples include disputes between the premier and the president in Hungary 
that were brought to Constitutional Court and consecutive attempts of L. 
Walensa to influence the appointment of the chief officials in Polish television 
(Price 1995; Sparks with Reading, 1998; Splichal, 1994). Only in East Ger-
many, in the short period after the revolution and unification, the civil society 
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representatives were appointed (Downey, 1995; Splichal, 1994; Sparks with 
Reading, 1998).  
 Further, although formally abolished, censorship has occurred occasionally. 
For instance, polish broadcasting law from 1993 ‘contained the condition that 
both private and public broadcasters should respect Christian values’ (Downey 
1995, p. 60). It is also worth noting that due to the negotiated nature of 1989 
revolutions there were no extensive changes in personnel, apart from those on 
the chief positions (Sparks with Reading, 1998, pp. 99-100 and 131-132). As a 
consequence, the type of journalism has not changed significantly either. ‘Me-
dia in Eastern Europe tend to rely on official sources and to under-report the 
‘why’ and ‘how’ explanatory elements’ (Milton in O’Neil ed., 1997, p.7). The 
personnel continuity also facilitated self-censorship of journalists and editors.  
 Finally, introduction of some market mechanisms occurred in special 
circumstances under which neither the efficiency of broadcasting operating 
was increased, nor was the independence from politics ensured. I will discuss 
this more in detail below. In addition, technological changes were also very 
moderate due to the economic difficulties in Eastern European countries 
(Splichal, 1994, xi). All listed phenomena from post-communist television 
broadcasting reality indicate that is more appropriate to talk about certain con-
tinuity with previous practices than about a radical break with the past.  
 I will now turn more closely to exploring persistence of politics in televi-
sion broadcasting and the reasons for that. According to Zizek, there are two 
main obstacles in introducing market economy and liberal democracy in East-
ern European societies: ‘[…] on the one hand, the remainders of the old to-
talitarian forces that, although they lost the battle, continue with their under-
ground machinations; on the other hand, national corporatism, obsession with 
national unity and with an imagined ‘threat to the nation’’ (Zizek, 1992, p. 26). 
The same general reasons worked as an impediment for introducing democ-
ratic television broadcasting. I will first consider the later. 
 After the collapse of communism, Eastern Europeans faced multiple transi-
tion – from centrally planed to market economy, and from (post)totalitarianism 
to liberal democracy. That posed special difficulties to new political elites. In 
Western societies market developed first; democracy followed. The multiple 
transitions were without precedents and models to copy. At the same time, all 
countries faced problems connected with their new status that is independence 
from the foreign patronage. Some of them chose to be independent states for 
the first time in their history. That included rewriting constitutions and history 
and defining citizenship, statehood and nationhood. As some of these tasks are 
difficult, sometimes even impossible to reconcile, it was necessary to gain a 
broad support for the government decisions. The media, especially television 
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broadcasting, were once again assigned the role of promoting the common 
goals (Jakubowicz, 1994, pp. 281-182). Although national consciousness 
played an important role in freeing Eastern Europeans from Soviet patronage 
and undemocratic regime, introducing of new democracies were severely im-
periled by nationalist sentiments, as the exclusive logic of nationalism contra-
dicts inclusiveness as one of the main democratic principles (Linz and Stepan, 
1996, pp. 16-38).  
 Not only national minorities’ interests were suppressed in the new populist 
television broadcasting practices. The other democratic forces that could influ-
ence broadcasting policy were also soon squeezed out by daily politics. How 
has happened that television became an instrument of the new political elites? 
There were several reasons for that. The new political elites were mostly re-
cruited from civil society activists, and the ‘rebirth’ of civil society during the 
last decade of communism occurred under some specific features. Due to the 
nature of communism, civil society was developed in ‘vacuum’ with no con-
nections with economic and political society, which themselves were under the 
state control. It was also predominantly driven by groups of intellectuals, with 
no broader public involvement (if we exclude the 1989 events). These groups 
of dissidents have eventually formed political opposition and took over the 
power after 1989. But, once in the power, not surprisingly, they proved to have 
a little experience in governing (Schopflin 1993, p. 286).  
 According to Schopflin, the most severe damage done by communism was 
institutions’ destruction. Official institutions were distrusted because of their 
role as an instrument of the party control and repression, and loyalty was in-
stead personalized and attributed to individuals. The lack of faith in institu-
tions was shared by the new elites as well. A combination of unrealistic ex-
pectations due to their inexperience in management, and distrust in bureauc-
racy, led them to blame their communist antecedents for inadequate achieve-
ments in pursuing policies, and to appointing ‘trustworthy’ personnel. The re-
sult was politicized bureaucracy (Schopflin, 1993, pp. 274-286).  
 Another consequence of inexperience of the new political elites was that 
they were unaccustomed to democratic procedures and bargain practices. As a 
result, they soon start bitter political struggle not only with their opponents, 
but also between themselves (Downey, 1998, p. 52; Kleinwaechter, 1998). 
Once like-minded in critique of the state socialism, the democratic opposition 
than ‘re -invented’ television as an important mean for exercising political 
power. The political struggle was clearly manifested in disputes over television 
broadcasting legislation. As a result, the laws were passed with delay, which 
allowed informal practices and power structure to develop in the meantime. 
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So, even once passed, the laws were ‘placed under considerable strain in the 
daily practice of broadcasting’ (Sparks with Reading, 1998, p. 154). 
 Reasons why changes in television broadcasting in Eastern Europe have not 
taken a direction of implementing more features of market-oriented model 
partly overlap with the reasons stated above. On a normative level, there was a 
consensus about desirability of the public television model. One component of 
that preference was a genuine belief that the public television model is better 
suited for opening of democratic media space. The other was more dubious in 
nature. Television was considered too big and too important to be owned by 
entrepreneurs independent from politics (Sparks with Reading, 1998, pp. 146-
147). As mentioned above, new political elites needed it for legitimating pur-
poses. It could be also used to influence elections results.  
 But there were also important structural-economic constraints for introduc-
tion of the market model. Eastern European countries are generally small and, 
more importantly, poor measured by western standards. Advertising market is 
thus underdeveloped, despite the rate of growth after 1989 (Sparks with Read-
ing, 1989, p. 144). For example, if we compare two of roughly equal size – 
Poland and Spain ‘[i]n 1993 television advertising expenditure in Spain was 
US $ 4,846 million; in Poland it was US $ 236 million’ (European Audio-
Visual Observatory, 1995, in Sparks with Reading, 1998, p. 145). In addition, 
political and economic development was uncertain, which made bigger foreign 
investments highly improbable. 
 However, in all Visegrad countries at least one television channel was 
privatized, and mixed model was introduced. But, as Splichal points out, pri-
vatization is often not conducted for efficiency reasons, but to fill exhausted 
state budgets. Another aim of privatization was a redistribution of wealth and 
power (Splichal, 1995, p. 55), and allocations of frequencies for private broad-
casting were intensely politicized. Thus, the privatization neither increased ef-
ficiency nor economic and political independence.  
 In fact, the result was that programme strategies moved even further from 
public service model. ‘[B]roadcasters […] face a dilemma. One option will be 
to attempt to maximize their revenue from advertising, partly at least to dis-
tance themselves from direct financial pressure from the government. This 
strategy could be complemented by attempting to minimize programme costs 
by using a high proportion of imported popular programmes’ (Sparks and 
Reading, 1994, p. 265). As the first option, the time assigned to advertising, is 
limited by law much more in the case of non-private than private broadcasters, 
the second option is likely to take place. That means that the non-private 
broadcasters will effectively be acting as commercial broadcasters. Besides 
small advertising markets and legal limits to amount of advertising, Sparks and 
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Reading list the quotas for local production as the third obstacle for non-pri-
vate broadcasters to free themselves from economic and thus political pressure 
coming from the government, since domestic production is usually more ex-
pensive (Sparks and Reading, 1994, p. 266). 
 To sum up, it can be said that 1989 did not bring radical changes in televi-
sion broadcasting in Eastern Europe. Because of direct political or indirect 
economic pressures television stayed heavily dependant on the state. It seems 
that, although the state has significantly loosen the grip over the Eastern Euro-
pean societies after the break-up of communism, the legacy of the strong 
communist state which has aimed to penetrate in every aspect of social life, 
could not disappear overnight and its influence has remain relatively strong. 
The lack of democratic tradition, weak economies and inexistence of a strong 
middle class as a precondition for vibrant civil society work as impediments 
for opening of the democratic public sphere. Television broadcasting shares 




 In this essay I argued that changes in television broadcasting in Eastern 
Europe that followed 1989 revolutions were modest rather than radical and 
that it is more appropriate to talk about continuity with the previous practices 
instead of a complete break with the past. I also argued that changes in televi-
sion broadcasting couldn’t be understood without reference to broader socio-
political context in which they occurred. In doing so, it is important to bear in 
mind both structural and dynamic dimension of social processes.  
 It is very likely that the factors described as legacies of the past are eventu-
ally going to diminish, if not disappear completely. In the last decade Eastern 
European, and especially Visegrad countries, have made significant economic 
progress, and become more and more similar to western democracies. As they 
became EU members, those trends are likely to be continued and even intensi-
fied. Does it mean a possibility to introduce a public television broadcasting 
model is difficult to say. Television broadcasting systems are most probably 
going to advance technologically and become more market-oriented. Will it 
make them more independent from the state, dependant on market, both, or 









1  Some authors, for instance Brzezinski (1989, p. 254), even find the role of the media the key factor in 
the break-up of communism. 
2  It is worth noting that changes in television broadcasting do not coincide completely with broader social 
and political changes. Thus, the arguments about changes of television broadcasting cannot be used to 
prove or disprove theories about transformation of Eastern European societies. However, as the influ-
ence of social context on changes in television broadcasting is crucial for their understanding, I am go-
ing to use segments of different theories of social transformation to support my arguments. But, a sys-
tematic presenting of those theories, and their complex relationship with television broadcasting is out 
of scope of this paper. 
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 Ovaj rad analizira promjene u televizijskom emitiranju u zemljama Istočne 
Europe nakon pada komunističkih režima uzimajući u obzir i istodobne socio-
političke promjene u tim državama. Smatra se da su one bile nepotpune, a 
istaknuta su dva glavna objašnjenja takve tvrdnje. Prvo, promjene u televizij-
skom emitiranju nakon 1989. godine nisu predstavljale radikalan raskid s ko-
munističkim modelom emitiranja, jer se i on sam djelimice promijenio do 
1989. godine, posebno tijekom 1980-ih. Drugo, bile su nepotpune zahvaljujući 
različitim nasljeđima iz prošlosti koja su predstavljala velike prepreke u pro-
vođenju korijenitijih promjena. 
 
Ključne riječi: televizijsko emitiranje, Istočna Europa, komunistički režim, 
promjene, naslijeđe iz prošlosti 
 
